Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Taiwanese PC OEM Analyses

Examining the vertical of Taiwan's PC (personal computer) OEMs (original equipment manufacturers) through the lenses of:
I. Porter's Five-Forces Model
II. External Factors Environmental Scan


I. PORTER'S FIVE FORCES MODEL


INTENSITY OF RIVALRY AMONG INDUSTRY COMPETITORS
  • High concentration of similar competitors all located in Taiwan.
  • All supply the same large, mainly American clients.
  • Same relocations of factories in particular regions of China.
  • Low switching costs for buyers.
  • Channel conflict of selling to main buyers, who also sell to public market competitors want to sell more into.
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS/ BARRIERS TO ENTRY

  • Economies of scale established by approx. a dozen players.
  • Not much product differentiation – poor or nonexistent branding (white labeling).
  • Capital intensive requirements.
  • Very high level engineering and machine requirements.
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES

  • High availability of similar, very high-quality substitutes.
  • Buyer’s switching costs low.
  • High price competitiveness – buyer’s market.
BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS

  • Limited number of main buyers such as IBM, HP, Apple, Gateway, Compaq, Dell.
  • Many substitute providers.
  • Low evidence of buyer loyalty.
BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS
  • Many substitute providers.
  • Similar high-quality competitors.
  • Industry important to country.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN AT THE BUSINESS LEVEL BASED ON EXTERNAL FACTORS

MARKET FACTORS

  • Downward trend in market demand.
  • Downward drop in PC pricing.
  • Low upgrade rates – what customers have now is sufficient for performing most desktop functions.
  • Too many competitors in the space selling to the same brand names like IBM, Dell, Gateway, HP, etc.
  • End customers perceive little differentiation between Dell and Gateway, for ex.
COMPETITIVE FACTORS
  • Existing competitors have excess capacity.
  • Profit margins have plummeted.
  • Some developing economy opportunities.
ECONOMIC, GOVERNMENT FACTORS

  • Current government unknowledgeable and ineffective in technology policy development.
  • Investing in agriculture to meet special interest group demands.
  • Poor management of stock market.
  • Administration continuing efforts to develop relationships with other developing nations, and sell bulk quantities of Taiwanese companies’ own brands.
TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
  • Few new technological/engineering innovations.
SOCIAL FACTORS
  • General market feeling of "What to do now?"
Analysis of PC OEMs in Taiwan

The personal computer manufacturing industry in Taiwan, Republic of China, is in deep trouble. Product leadership positions are occupied by Acer, Gigabyte, and Microtek, with innumerable me-too players, in the manufacture of chips, motherboards/mainboards, monitors, personal computers of all types, and all peripherals, including printers and scanners. Many OEMs built tremendously beautiful, high-tech production facilities complete with the most innovative production lines, best R&D departments staffed by scientists and engineers. This debt is not being paid back by the projected sales claimed by buyers such as household PC names like Dell, Gateway, IBM, HP.

The industry itself is crowded with very competent players, many of whom have moved their production lines to mainland China in order to survive. There has been a shakeout, and some consolidation, where main motherboard manufacturers acquire the OEMs of other PC-related parts.

I believe these players may have an opportunity to expand into other markets - such as Brazil, Chile, and certain countries in the Caribbean (Dominican Republic). The US market is saturated, and the branding problems are too large. China is also a strong possibility for promotional inroads as many OEMs have already invested there. The government needs to invest more aggressively in branding initiatives highlighting the technical capabilities of its PC market. Certain market leaders should be cultivated – Acer, Gigabyte, and Microtek in particular should receive some government support to gain more international market share. A high level international PR/branding/advertising firm should also be considered to leverage the strengths of this industry along with announcing the strong support of the government. There needs to be product and company differentiation – branding is key. Debt considerations/allowances could be made by the banks with the support of the government.

The Fast Food Industry: Kentucky Fried Chicken


The Fast Food Industry: Kentucky Fried Chicken


The fast-food industry is a multi-billion dollar global industry, and one of the largest in the world, with multiple and diverse players. Most of the strongest brands are American, and despite short-term ups-and-downs, the greater expansion pace doesn’t show signs of abating.

The hottest regions are the emerging economies (such as China), being fought over by competitors such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, Wendy’s, Pizza Hut, and of course McDonald’s, which leads the industry in sales, profitability, number of retail stores and overall brand recognition. Most of these competitors are highly vertically-integrated franchises with very strong integrated operations and strategic planning systems.

In many countries these establishments are perceived as quintessentially representative of “American culture”, and this is both a boon and a danger for fast-food outlets. The attraction of American culture is a strong lure, and good for business; but today special interest groups such as Greenpeace, PETA, Muslim fundamentalists and other protectionists are increasingly active in boycotting and otherwise damaging outlets’ businesses.

Kentucky Fried Chicken (Japan) Limited (KFC-J) was started as a joint venture (JV) in early 1970 between JV initiator Mitsubishi, who wanted to develop domestic demand for its poultry operation, and Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC). Harland (Colonel) Sanders had franchised in 1956 a fried chicken recipe that was so successful, he sold some 700 franchises in 9 years. KFC was bought by John Y. Brown and Jack Massey for $2 million from the 74-yr. old founder in 1964, and in the next 5 yrs. KFC revenue grew from $7 million to $200 million. In 1970 KFC was building 1,000 stores a year in the U.S. However, the rapid growth caused a big problem: management turnover, and by the late-1970’s the U.S. economy slipping into a recession caused the stock to fall from $58 to $18. The management exodus continued.

Compounding matters, a fast food industry shakeout began, and franchisees suffered under the lack of higher management support and guidance, the recession, and strong competition. Low morale affected customer service and product quality, and management was too preoccupied with its own internal disagreements to pay much attention to international operations. In mid-1971 Brown and Massey sold KFC in a stock swap to Heublein, Inc., a packaged goods company with well-branded franchises such as Smirnoff Vodka.

KFC’s small international staff was folded into Heublein’s international group, which struggled to control the independently-minded foreign subsidiaries. Meanwhile, KFC-J under Loy Weston and Shin Ohkawara went ahead with their own development plans, including menu adjustments; and thinking of KFC-J as a fashion business, focusing marketing on upscale young couples and children, which helped KFC-J to thrive. By the end of 1972, 14 new stores mainly in Tokyo opened, and in 1973 50 more were added. 1974 was slated to be KFC-J’s first profitable year, but the oil crisis hit Japan, and losses began, causing refinancing and store expansion slowdown.

In 1975, Michael Miles was appointed VP-Int’l Operations for Heublein, and strategic planning was his credo. He focused his attention on KFC’s international operations, and implemented a strong strategic planning system, which took about 2 years for subsidiaries to gradually adopt. KFC-J, however, was resistant and adopted what it could to Japanese practices, and went along with the new system reluctantly. In 1976, KFC-J made its first profit, 14 million yen, a modest amount.

In the early 1980’s KFC headquarters reorganized under pressures of domestic operations doing poorly, which was significant as it accounted for 2/3 of KFC’s global sales. Churches and other aggressive new competitors appeared. Miles focused upon a “back-to-basics program” of quality, service, and cleanliness systems (QSC); and by 1979 profits rebounded, bringing KFC closer to McDonald’s profit levels.

Miles hired a professional manager, Bob Hiatt, to duplicate the systems with the international subsidiaries, with the pitch that “better strategic plans meant better bottom-line results” and the operational aim of achieving consistency and control worldwide. KFC-J again resisted, citing Mitsubishi’s practices, and preferring short-term losses for long-term gains. However, Hiatt and other senior managers insisted on reports (store-level efficiency targets, QSC ratings, trends) and operations control systems to improve strategy, financial systems, and database management systems. Performance bonuses were also implemented to help with management performance and retention.

As international operations slowly improved, giving KFC strong sales growth and profitability, R.J. Reynolds (RJR) acquired the company in October 1982 as part of its diversifying away from tobacco products. KFC then came under the control of Richard Mayer, who also held strong convictions about the values of strategic planning. Although KFC-J was KFC’s largest, fastest-growing, and highest-potential international subsidiary, by late 1983, KFC-J was opening its 400th store, by on a per-capita basis this represented less than 25% the level of penetration in the U.S.

The entry barriers to the fast-food industry are relatively high if there is only one outlet – the savings increase exponentially when the number of outlets increase, and product quality and supply is controlled. For KFC-J, supply was easier through it’s powerful Joint Venture partner, Mitsubishi, which provided poultry and other supplies. Additionally, as it had in early 1970’s, Mitsubishi was also a funding source. So, a new fast-food entrant has better chances of surviving if it has a parent or partner or some other funding source with which it can set up strong strategic planning and operations systems, particularly in Japan.

Market conditions are another consideration, as burger-type of chains are dominated by McDonald’s, Burger King, and Wendy’s. For KFC, Popeye’s is its biggest challenger. The nature of the fast-food industry is about price, convenience, taste, and environment. Brand comfort is certainly a consideration, but locale and price dominate. Chains which can physically dominate good locations and have alternative menus such as “Dollar Menus” or foods preferred by local tastes do best. Buyers can easily switch if competitors are physically located closely to each other, so quality control is an additional concern. It is more profitable to retain an existing customer than to acquire a new one.

KFC’s management of its international operations has improved dramatically over the last 3 decades. Implementing strategic planning and operational controls is critical, and although more entrepreneurial spirits consider the reporting and other controls stifling, in a organization the size of KFC’s, controls are imperative. Consistency of product, including its environment, are key to brand recognition and drawing traffic. Good management knowledge of outlets’ activities is invaluable to decision-making, including how much of what kind of support to provide. McDonald’s “owns” its suppliers in the sense that its control over product quality is total and huge in dollars. For KFC-J, having Mitsubishi as a solid, agreed upon JV partner could not be a better fit in solidifying against Porter’s concerns of Supplier and Substitutes control, Buyer control, and resistance to New Entrants.

The nature of the Japanese market was also condusive to KFC-J’s success, as the involvement of the Japanese government is critical to success in Japan. Other competitors seeking entry to Japan would need a similarly strongly positioned partner the caliber of Mitsubishi or some other sogo sosha.

Dick Mayer should consider carefully where to move Loy Weston. Weston has been with KFC-J for a long time, and despite his success in Japan, in the 4 years since he’d taken on the VP-North Pacific position, progress had been slow. Shin Ohkawara was doing fine running KFC-J, but Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong needed not just an entrepreneurial spirit, but also a strong strategic mind with an taste for detail. Mayer should examine the reasons why KFC-J was successful, and determine how much both Weston and Ohkawara actually contributed. Perhaps in actuality he might have ridden on Ohkawara’s strengths, or Mitsubishi’s strengths, or lucky market conditions, or some combination. If he really did have a workable system, at least some parts of it should be transferable to success in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong Kong (KTTHK).

Assuming that KFC-International is still regionally based, Mayer at HQ could:
- have KFC-HQ create another position to put Weston in,
- OR put him back as KFC-J head,
- and in either case promote Ohkawara to VP-North Pacific.

Before that, Mayer could first give Weston stricter performance achievables within a reasonable timeframe, as determined by market studies. In the meantime, Mayer could have Ohkawara evaluated to see if he might have a greater chance at making KTTHK successful. It’s important to retain experienced management, and Mayer should figure out a politically expedient plan to retain both men, being particularly gentle with Weston. Weston, having been a white man heading up a large American enterprise in Japan for a long time and advancing in age, may be delicate to handle.

KFC-J, with its Mitsubishi partner, is strongly positioned in Japan, and growth can continue. Any new entrants should be watched for, but more attention should be paid to KTTHK.

KTTHK are different markets, but all are economic tigers with market segments which KFC would appeal to more from a brand perspective (fashion) than a price perspective (fast food isn’t always the cheapest source of food in overseas markets). Certain people in these markets might potentially resent a Japanese head (Ohkawara) of an American chain coming into the market, given the countries’ histories with Japan, so from a political standpoint having Mayer continue for a year or two longer might be better from a PR standpoint. Also, as he’s been with KFC for so long with a good track record, despite his shortcomings he’s still a valuable manager to retain. Mayer might find more politically comfortable ways to communicate the need for KTTHK to show results, perhaps spend some time personally with Weston in these countries and developing a strategic plan in tandem so that Weston feels he is involved with the new plan. Having management’s buy-in in critical to the successful implementation of a strategy.

Additionally, significant location scouting is important for Seoul, Taipei/Kaoshung, Bangkok, and HK Island/Kowloon, as fast-food’s primary marketing (product, price, PLACE, promotion) need is a high traffic, fashionable shopping area with lots of young buyers. Maybe Mayer could go on a few location scouts with Weston. All four of these urban markets have a rich supply of new repeat customers, in addition to tourist dollars. Location is key to KFC’s expansion in these areas, with specific studies to students’ and young office/retail workers’ traffic patterns. Appealing to their tastes is less important than location in a “hot” area, as these markets are all intent on emulating “American” culture.

I’d like to see KFC and all other fast food establishments make nutritional information available to customers. In the years that I and my family have traveled in these Asian countries, we have seen a shockingly obvious, rapid deterioration of young peoples’ health (overweight, acne). Taiwan and Hong Kong are particularly education-oriented, so one generally finds these establishments filled with students who munch on fast food while studying their copious homework. Business profitability is good, responsible business and profitability is better.
Microsoft + China = Relative Ethics? 
An application of Prof. Hofstede's Individualism Index















The Chinese government successfully influenced Gates' ethics regarding Microsoft expansion in China. How to look at Gates' culturally relativist business ethics?

Bill Gates wanted Microsoft to be the dominant operating system of the world: his philosophy and mission was and is to have Microsoft products in every computer, and help businesses and individuals realize their full potential (self-actualization) through the medium of technology. He has achieved his vision in no small part because of both his personal ethics, as well as the business ethics of the American individualist market system which fosters and rewards his type of behavior.

The direct power or indirect influence of Gates' business style and ethics upon other business leaders globally is immense. Microsoft's global market domination and Gates' resultant position as one of the wealthiest men in the world gives, to many observers, validation of his business ethics. His actions navigating the Chinese government's restrictions upon Microsoft's Internet Explorer were closely watched, and considered by other business leaders as an example set to follow in China.

In order to gain market share in China, Gates agreed to the Chinese government's demand that Microsoft's Internet Explorer and MSN Spaces (blog site) help it limit free speech, blocking words such as "freedom", "democracy" and "demonstration", "human rights" and "Taiwan independence", changing his business ethics from a strongly individualistic approach.
National wealth is likely to cause individualism (Professor Geert Hofstede, http://www.geert-hofstede.com) and Gates’ public speeches and investments in China demonstrate his belief is similar - that China’s speech restrictions and other human rights violations will “improve towards” Western standards as a result of increased individual and societal wealth. If their theses are accepted, the question then becomes, has Gates made an ethical business decision? Gates shifted from the American core belief in “absolute freedom of speech” to a “modified censorship” closer to China’s collectivist culture, primarily to achieve the business objective of tapping into the second largest, soon to be largest, population of Internet users in the world.

Gates suggested that the world is flattening and becoming a level playing field. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4660244.stm) Was he right in negotiating with the Communist government, acquiescing to their demands, putting a higher value on Chinese rather than his own American cultural mores? The highly individualistic, self-actualizing American cultural values are diametrically opposed to collectivist Chinese values of community over self-actualization. In American business ethics, the right of the corporation to freely compete in a market to fulfill its raison d’etre – growing shareholder value – is held paramount. Did Gate’s decision fall within the business ethic parameters of an American company? Did his decision fall within American social ethic parameters of free speech and human rights? Did he behave ethically at all from the American perspective?

Am
erican Cultural Beliefs and Values in Business and Society

Bill Gates is one of the wealthiest individuals in the world from the wealthiest country in the world, leading one of wealthiest MNCs (Multi-National Corporations) in the world; trying to dominate the software market of the largest, fastest growing, and one of the few remaining communist societies, in the world.

Hofstede describes American cultural beliefs and values as one dominated by individualism, and explores how this contributes to American business executives’ decision-making. Microsoft, like all companies entering into China, had to temper its proto-typical American business expectations and processes, proceeding distinctly differently from how it gained market-share in the US and Europe. Gates had to invest substantially extra time, effort as well as dollars into building a long-term relationship with the Chinese Communist government, in the hopes of future profitability. China’s rapidly developing socio-economic environment from a purely communist to its current “Communist Market Socialism” is volatile, where ever-shifting Communist policy developments demanded Gates’ close attention to the China market to protect Microsoft’s interests in piracy prevention, intellectual property protection, and fair market access.

Microsoft, established in 1975, still holds to its original mantra as reflected in its 2006 annual report, “At Microsoft, we work to help people and businesses throughout the world realize their full potential.” Some of its main values are: integrity, passion for customers and technology, always looking for ways to improve the products that they produce, making the best quality products and being accountable to investors, employees and customers. Gates had the vision of insisting IBM package Microsoft products with their personal computers while allowing him to maintain rights over the software – allowing him to corner the hardware market led by IBM. Over time, Gates evolved his philosophy of market dominance from not allowing any type of software mingling to seeing ways of making patches that would fix current problems and potential problems. This in turn enabled Microsoft to allow access and being more user-friendly with other companies’ products, while still maintaining proprietary rights of its software.

Hofstede generally describes Americans as “individualists” who feel this is at the core of each person’s success. Freedom, risk, self and corporate improvement, are ideals for an individualist. This translates into people being able to make their own decisions on a day-to-day basis. The saying, “The early bird gets the worm,” or “Keeping one step a head of the Joneses,” are illustrative of individualists’ competitive qualities. Hofstede also discusses Americans have a low avoidance index which translates into fewer rules, greater risk takers, and allows for difference in thinking, beliefs and values. These dimensions are what drive businesses like Microsoft to move into new economies and seize opportunities.

Microsoft needed to enter the Chinese market for three reasons. First, the prevention of China’s rampant pirating and copying software/hardware. Second, access to China’s enormous market. Third, decreasing operating/ production costs by basing research and development centers in China. Microsoft’s entry into China was initially small due to the Communist government’s limitations. Communist governments in particular tend to be protectionist of its nascent industries; as China is of its Information Communications Technology (ICT) industry. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in typical collectivist/ patriarchical fashion, seeks to set and control all technology standards (instead of letting the market and users make the standardization decisions.)

In order to negotiate China market entrance, Microsoft has to operate under the supervision of the Chinese government. It has also had to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in Research and Development (R&D) centers all over China, in conjunction with CCP agency-mandated joint ventures.

The Degree Of CCP Dominance In China’s Economy – A Collectivist Phenomenon

This degree of state dominance in market mechanisms was a great compromise conceded by American company Microsoft and its prototypically driven American CEO, Gates, who are accustomed by both culture and practice to exerting their individual will upon the markets.
In terms of Hofstede’s Individualism Index (IDV), China’s government dominates the operations of its economy to perhaps the greatest degree relative to almost all other countries. On the continuum of Individualist to Collectivist, China’s Communist government ranks up to the 61st least Individualist, out of 74 countries studied. Hofstede finds that the more Collectivist the culture of a people, the less they tend to seek self-actualization, preferring to maintain an “acquiescence” to authoritative leadership for the sake of “group harmony” and respect for others in the form of solidarity with the community. China, as a rapidly developing economy, is still one of the poorest nations in the world, with over one fifth of the world’s population under the patriarchic care of the Communist government. Hofstede notes that there is strong correlation between gross domestic product and the individualism of a culture.

The Collectivist phenomenon emphasizes the importance of the group, the strength of the group in demanding loyalty or acquiescence of individual desires to the good of the whole. Chinese culture is dominated by Confucian ethics, which dictates adherence to a strict hierarchical model of history, age, social position, gender, intellectual learning, loyalty to the state, filial piety to ancestors, all ascribing a citizen’s position in society.

This Chinese socio-cultural phenomenon translates into a high Power Distance Index (PDI) score, which reinforces the need for (or the ease in existence of) a strong “patriarchical” government. Although the Communist State’s manifesto is one of equality in all societal organizational forms, in reality it is the Chinese Collectivist phenomenon which permeates and forms all Chinese societal organization.

This translates, at the State’s policy development level, into one of “father-knows-best,” including the determination of economic operations, control over all aspects of its unique “social market,” and dictates based upon a “moral” authority over its people. Despite what “the people” may desire in their market choices, they are confined within the choices dictated by the State.

One of these choices is in the selection of software systems which are the nervous and circulatory system of every economy. China’s government has not permitted the market’s hand to make the choices for businesses and government agencies. Rather, it has created its own standards: for example, in mobile transmissions, it created its own unique CDMA standard, requiring all carriers and hardware manufacturers to ascribe to its technology regardless of costs, and applying loyalist propaganda, fines, and blacklists to define company and citizen’s choices. In software, to avoid use of Microsoft’s “overpriced,” monopolistic products, it has dictated use of competitor Red Hat’s Linux-based products (known as freeware or open source software, which costs significantly less than Microsoft’s products.)

Bill Gates, in negotiating with the Chinese government to make its market more open to Microsoft, had to concede investing significant dollars in building research & development centers in China’s major tier one and tier two cities. In this choice, he is trading off short-term market “loss-leaders” in hopes of long-term market gains. For a long-range decision-making framework such as the Communist Chinese government’s model, it gains in having R&D centers built for free, its “children” (citizens) gaining valuable experience and exposure to intellectual property for free, and extra time to make other market-protecting moves for its economy.

National Wealth Is More Likely Than Not To Cause Individualism?

Bill Gates’ view is held by many American IT firms: Speech restrictions in China are likely to relax given the enormous wealth being created across China; wealth will lead to individualism (rather than increased individualism will lead to increased wealth).

Hofstede hypothesized that the increase in individualism was explained by the increase in national wealth, and showed a statistical relationship between individualism and national wealth; where the arrow of causality pointed from wealth to individualism: countries became more individualist after they increased in wealth, not wealthier by becoming more individualist first. He saw the causation as increasing wealth leading to increased individualism rather than increasing individualism leading to increased wealth. Hofstede posits, we need to fight poverty if we want to promote human rights/individualism, rather than promote individualism/human rights as a way of fighting poverty.

Low Individualism (IDV) ranking in China

According to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, the Chinese rank lower than any other Asian country in the Individualism (IDV) ranking, at 20 compared to an average of 24. This is attributed in large part to the high level of emphasis on a Collectivist society by the CCP. (Hofstede, 2005) The low Individualism ranking is manifest in Chinese people valuing membership in a close and committed “group,” be that a family, extended family, or extended relationships, more than self-expression or self-actualization. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount. The society fosters strong relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members of their group.

From Confucian to Communist rule

Cultural values are relatively stable, but can change over the course of generations from contact with other cultures. China provides an example of changing cultural values resulting from internal political change. The CCP founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and brought political change greatly affecting traditional religious and Confucian values. After nearly 60 years of transferring from Confucianism to Communism, Chinese society enters the global economic stage, suddenly bombarded with diversified foreign cultures and expectations of multinational corporations who bring foreign direct investment (FDI); contributing to the continuing evolution of Chinese cultural values. Gates and other MNC leaders think the CCP should follow the “American’s way” to create national wealth. The CCP fears loss of control over the Chinese people if individualism is permitted to grow; but it also needs FDI to support the growth of China. In negotiations, it takes the position that China’s market is self-sustaining, and if the MNC wants access, it must adapt to the CCP’s demands.
Is the formula of “Free speech = high individualism = national wealth” proveable?

From Hofstede’s perspective, it is seen that high individualism and the associated rights such as free speech are not causes of national wealth. However, they are still key factors to attracting FDI which leads to the development of national wealth and GDP per capita.
Foreign direct investors, like Microsoft, must balance their expectations of the CCP, which has other concerns aside from free speech. For example, China’s rapid movement from an agrarian nation to one of multiple huge urban manufacturing centers has created a migrant peasant population, hundreds of millions large, seeking work in the cities. The CCP must control media coverage and advertising of factories opening or hiring, because migrant peasants would descend upon factories, becoming mobs demanding employment. The CCP must also protect the interests of the minority urban population whose affluence has attracted the resentment of the huge rural population; private property owners fear another radical populist social revolution. On this giant landmass of 1.3 billion disparate subcultures of people, the social justification for political authoritarianism is deeply entrenched.

Free Speech Rights vs Rights to Development: Cultural Relativism?

As more companies expand into “closed” market economies, the position they take on censorship, human rights, and other politically charged areas is increasingly complex. Microsoft grappled with the issue of what is held close to the hearts of Americans: freedom of speech and lack of censorship. The CCP on the other spectrum, holds close to their hearts the need for censorship, and has many government regulatory offices to keep the Chinese public closed from politically charged information. The overarching question is: which approach is more ethical, or is this actually a case of cultural relativism?

For some groups, Microsoft has violated an ethical value held close to highly individualistic Western societies: that of restricting freedom; whether freedom of speech, access to information, or political choices. Microsoft recently addressed U.S. Congress regarding its deal “acquiescing” to the CCP. In his speech, Krumholtz indicated that “Microsoft believes that issues of Internet content and customer security go to the heart of our values as a company” (Microsoft Congressional Testimony, 2006). Krumholtz also stated, “...A difficult judgment of risks and benefits of these powerful technologies [exist], not just in China, but in a wide range of societies where cultural and political values may clash with [American] standards of openness and free expression” (Microsoft Congressional Testimony, 2006). It is seen as a violation of what America stands for, as well as contradicting the United Nations Agreements on Human Rights.

Hofstede’s research revealed that there is a relationship between economic growth and a shift toward individualism. Having said this, Cetron and Davis (2006) indicate in their article, “The Dragon versus the Tiger: China and India Reshape the Global Economy,” that China’s economic growth is one of the fastest growing economies, despite being communist (India’s government is a democracy. They point out, Western hackers are working on developing software to counter the censorship filters, and suggest, “…The outside world may break through the Great Firewall of China sooner than Beijing would like". The introduction of the internet and the technology which runs this medium makes it difficult for censoring at all levels which is perhaps where the Chinese Government feels that if companies like Microsoft, Google and others sign off on their policies to limit search power, blogging, access to “politically charged” information, etc that they will be able to control. In “Despite Web Crackdown, Prevailing Winds are Free,” Guo Liang observes, “The internet is open technology, based on packet switching and open systems, and is totally different from traditional media, like radio or TV or newspaper." The article goes on to say this is a censors’ nightmare as it is not possible to monitor all the possibilities. Therefore, Microsoft’s agreeing to the CCP’s demands isn’t as limiting as it would appear.

The use of this form of technology has great potential to provide the much loved ideal of freedom of speech in the Westerners perspective. It also gives some security to those using this medium of “protection” from being found out by the Chinese regulatory agents. In a culture which ranks high on the uncertainty avoidance scale, this would suggest that the risk of searching and blogging would be low and a greater willingness for Chinese citizen’s use of these tools.

Krumholtz’ Congressional Testimony (2006) indicates, this type of technology is creating a more open and transparent approach. Krumholtz quoting from Bill Gates, “You may be able to take a very visible Web site and say that something shouldn’t be there, but if there is a desire by the population to know something, it is going to get out.”

Ethical Relativism

The ethical relativism perspective to this question accepts that both the American cultural approach and the CCP cultural approach are correct in their own ways. It is hard to suggest that one is of greater importance then the other. Does this then suggest it is cultural relativism? By Lund’s (1998) definition, “This [cultural relativism] means that every culture has an equal right to be different, distinct and unique”; and in her article “Development and Rights,” she clarifies that a synergy between universalism and cultural relativism, is the ideal to be sought – neither approach is absolutist.

Where do we go from here? Alder’s approach looks at ethical decision-making process in stages: problem recognition, information search, construction of alternatives, choice, and implementation. Microsoft and Gates may have gone through a similar process, leading to their decision to acquiesce to the CCP. We may infer some of this from the Congressional Testimony presented by Krumholtz.

The first question focused on describing American cultural briefs & values, they mainly revolved around the individualist culture. Maslow explained that there were five needs that had to be satisfied. They are physiological, safety, self-actualization and esteem. The essential one of the needs is self-actualization. This is used by Americans much more so than in foreign countries like China.

The second question focused on the degree of government control over economic forces. Per Hofstede, China rates the highest of Asian cultures on the collectivist side, where the people are not likely to seek self-actualization since it is a lesser priority. China is becoming an economic power but still is one of the poorest countries of the world, and until per capita GDP increases for more of the poor in China, its culture and government will continue to be strongly collectivist, forcing American companies to make concessions in order to gain market growth in China

The third question considered whether individualism leads to wealth or wealth leads to individualism, and which is “better” or “more ethical.” It is considered here that cultural relativism is the best approach for American firms in China,

The fourth question focused on ethical issues between free speech rights of the individual versus development rights of the community. This review is concluding that Gates’ negotiations with China were more expedient in achieving all objectives: by extending his short-term view to a long-term view corresponding with the Chinese culture’s long-term view, acceding his more prototypical American business culture values of speed and market dominance, as well as the American sociocultural emphasis upon free speech human rights and high individualism; Gates was able to achieve market entre and cooperation with the CCP’s many agencies. This review also concludes that Gates’ negotiations with China will lead to greater access to information (despite current censorship levied by the CCP), contributing to increased wealth of the Chinese people (more information leads to more self-actualization and perhaps increased entrepreneurship), and drive movement towards increased individualism and associated human rights (by Western cultural ideals) such as free speech.

Then & Now: Theodore Levitt's Globalization of Markets


Prof. Theodore Levitt (Harvard Business School) stated almost two decades ago that "[t]he globalization of markets is at hand. With that, the multinational commercial world nears its end, and so does the multinational corporation"

How does today's global business environment comport with his vision? He may not have been prescient, but he pointed the way foreshadowing the tumultuous developments.

Whether called “Multinational Corporation” (MNC) or “Global Corporation” (GC), the animal is the same - only that it has gone through evolutions across the decades. Levitt used the name of MNC for the previous form, and the name of “Global Corporation” for the next evolved form. At the time of Levitt’s writing (1983) he characterized the MNC as "operating in a number of countries, adjusting its products and practices in each – at relatively high costs." He contrasted this “old” MNC form to the “new” corporation, the “Global Corporation” (GC), as one which "operates in difference countries without adjusting its products and practices – and at relatively low costs."

I think the current iteration of management practices and the corporation’s role in globalization is evolving - at an accelerated rate - and this may be the “new” nature of the GC: adaptability. (A return to “old” MNC, Levitt may say.)

Several trends contribute to this evolving form:
- Our times are driven by technology
- Our times are driven by the leadership of certain countries’ companies and their associated larger culture - particularly American.
- The dotcom boomers such as web-related companies, IT/SW companies on the network side, telecom companies, and even companies which supported these companies (management consulting firms) all colluded, hand-in-hand with voracious VC’s, to the feeding of new funding practices, management practices, and expectations.
- Wall Street catapaulted along, and international money markets fed the tidal ripple effect in the rest of the world.

It is no wonder then, as instant cable news and the Internet bandied about American firms’ ridiculously large valuation numbers achieved in embarrassingly short times; as MTV and other tv shows made American culture and material desires the standards-bearer for personal consumption; as McDonald’s, Nike, Coca-Cola, Starbucks, and Citibank made the American culture physically ubiquitous; and as Americans/Europeans and “western” ways of conducting business dominated WTO/IMF/World Bank/UNDP negotiations; that there should be backlash and resentment against all things American/western – not least of all the capitalist way of doing things and its tentacled manifestation, the Global Corporation.

Now, in our post-dotcom, 9-11 and domestic terrorist attacks era, the nature of the corporation is once again evolving to the changing landscape. Levitts’ perspective, that the global/human commonality of scarcity drives the efficiency model and the desire for money, is valid…

But I’d like to add that our era now requires GCs to pay more attention to the needs of locals - and that some measures of social responsibility need to be taken. Human life and the operation of corporations cannot be all about efficiencies and profitability.

Levitt’s perspective is essentially based on the need for standards - an agreeable position that is difficult to reinforce - because human being are inherently territorial, and seek to differentiate… Particularly under situations of duress (New Zealanders or Native Americans losing their land, heritage) or even of age (teens across races, religious, are affected by raging hormones).

Today’s industrial revolution of technology has made communication instantaneous, feeding the creation and fast growth of a global culture. In the world of technology, without a doubt this need is great – IEEE has made good inroads in this, along with the W3 Consortium (Tim Berners-Lee’s group).

In the realm of trade, certainly the need for standards is also clear. WTO has made significant steps in addressing the need for all countries to abide by the same set of rules. Further, in commercial products, the human desire for the newest or the best is as naturally unavoidable as crows’ attraction to shiny objects, so standardization of “high quality” is an ever rising bar as innovations percolate.

However, today’s global era demands that GCs do need to adapt to the local tastes, they should understand what the customer wants, and not presume to know the customer better than the customer himself. Purchases are not based upon price alone, unless they are generic products… Broadly speaking, purchases are emotionally driven – which is why “brand” means more now than ever as homogenization spreads. Even with technology-related products.

Today’s GC is both “fox” and “hedgehog” - Ikea’s success makes it methodology an attractive model to study. It has maintained both its own standards, as well as made regional/local adaptations. Toys-R-Us and McDonalds have also found it beneficial to pay attention to “[d]ifferent cultural preferences, national tastes and standards, and business institutions”. Any GC seeking future profit must be both in China. So, Levitt’s example of Hoover is for me an indication for the “new” GC to make adjustments in its attitude. Lacking knowledge about new features available, buyers stated what they thought they wanted. With new marketing promotions, they discovered other more desirable features. But the corporation’s attitude, I think, should still be of giving the customer what he wants – not being “thoughtlessly accommodating” - but of thoughtfully sharing.

Several trends have catalyzed the arrival of today’s era:
- Technology at the enterprise level has transformed economies of scale across industries, contributing to M&As.
- M&As have proliferated across media, communications, consumer products, and distribution channel industries, contributing to the homogenization of information as well as products offered.
- But perhaps the most powerful of all, the “product” and brand of American culture has homogenized the global “taste” for products. As with Italian fashion culture, the “brand” of a culture is a powerful motivator to purchases, in addition to the individual- and country-level trends mentioned above, which drive the GC’s evolution. Low price regardless of features, or heavy promotions regardless of price, are alone not the primary drivers of purchases. Brand associations are very powerful – and as GCs continue to merge and acquire each other and homogenize products, and consumers get swept up in common consumption tastes, product lines will increasingly rely upon “perceived” value differentiations that branding cloaks products in.

Convergence is happening, yes. But not to the exclusion of addressing sub- or micro-level overseas sensitivities or practices. Some markets (China) are simply too large or variegated to be forcibly and quickly changed by GCs without the GCs themselves making significant adaptations in their own practices and products. GCs who adapt to standards but also address local environmental conditions, cultural and institutional needs are the ones that find a smoother path to market entrance and market share.