- Finance/Banking JP Morgan, Chase, and M&A
- Construction Caterpillar vs. Komatsu: Four Decades of Global Competition
- Information Technology Taiwanese PC OEM Analyses
- Consumer Retail The Fast Food Industry: Kentucky Fried Chicken
- Information Technology Microsoft + China = Relative Ethics?
- Consumer Products Coca-Cola Business Leadership
- Globalization Then & Now: Theodore Levitt's Globalization of Markets
- Innovation Innovation and Michael Porter's Five-Forces Model
- Operations Organizational Structures of Multinational Corporations
- Operations Multinational Corporations' Use of Strategic Alliances
JP Morgan, Chase, and Mergers and Acquisitions
INTRODUCTION
The recent merger between JP Morgan and Chase has strengthened both firms and increased its competitiveness in the global financial services industry, and in the M&A space. JPMC’s global competitive position within its industry will be analyzed through applying Porter’s framework. Strategic foci will be reviewed on increasing JPMC’s competitiveness in the M&A business, with an emphasis on Asia.
JP Morgan and Chase Manhattan are two of the largest power houses in the financial services industry. JP Morgan was known for its quality and reliability in investment banking, asset management, and operating services. Founded in 1854 by Junius Morgan, by 2000, the company reported a net income of $1.170 billion in 2000. Chase Manhattan is the third largest bank in the United States and known for its retail banking capabilities in the corporate and consumer market. Its revenue for the year 2000 were reported as $1.09 billion reflecting a drop of over 20% for the previous year.
Chase Manhattan believed it necessary to enter the investment banking sector in order to remain viable as a company and continue its growth worldwide. The weakest links in Chase Manhattan’s product line are its attempts to enter the investment banking market and its market share in Asia.
In 2000, the financial services sector experienced an array of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) including consolidation moves by Credit Suisse, Citigroup, and Swiss Bank. These corporations were expanding their product lines, customer base, and core capabilities by merging or acquiring companies who were capable of adding new core competencies to the existing corporation. Chase Manhattan realized early on that in order to survive and prosper, it had to increase its reach into Asia and develop a foothold in the investment banking sector. JP Morgan was the company of choice.
JP Morgan was strong in Japanese government bonds and asset management, while Chase offered retail and institutional stockbroking in the Pacific Rim. In Australia, JP Morgan offered project financing and securitisation. Chase Manhattan was a strong player in fixed income capital markets, syndicated loans, and an entry-level player in investment banking through its purchase of Ord Minnett. As a combined entity, JP Morgan Chase Co. (JPMC) offered a multitude of product lines to consumers and corporations ranging from credit cards, project financing, bonds, stockbroking, and insurance.
In December 2000, JP Morgan and Chase Manhattan merged in a deal reportedly worth $35 billion, one of the largest mergers in the history of financial institutions. After the merger, JPMC is acknowledged as a giant in the financial services industry with almost all product lines ranked in the top 10 worldwide. The power of JPMC is especially evident in M&A on an international level. JPMC is ranked first in M&As in Latin America and Asia by various observers (see Appendices). In Asia, JPMC commanded a reported $55 billion share in 2000.
JPMC M&A INDUSTRY POSITIONING
THE INDUSTRY
The deal between Chase and JP Morgan is part of a series of consolidations in the financial services industry. Credit Suisse Group's acquiring of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette for $13.4 billion, Citigroup Inc. acquiring Associate First Capital Corp for approximately $31 billion in stock, and Swiss bank acquiring the Paine Webber Group Inc. for approximately $11 billion, were part of the larger trend in consolidation within the financial services industry.
The industry was also being faced with the emergence and growth of Internet – related brokerages such as the e-Trade Group, Ameritrade, Datek and Suretrade. These new competitors are offering innovative services more conveniently at a cheaper cost, winning away cost conscious consumers from individuals, Wall Street, and storefront businesses.
With the current environment of industry consolidation, the rapid ascent of “universal banks”, and the effects of Internet competition, JP Morgan could not remain independently competitive on the global stage for long.
The global financial industry is dominated by American brands such as Citibank, Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), Goldman Sachs, and Bank of America. Despite a decline in the world’s economy, the financial services sector made a strong showing in Fortune’s 2002 Global 500 Ranking.
JPMC INDUSTRY POSITION
JPMC today, one month shy of its two year anniversary, holds an overall 54th place in the Global 500 with $50.4 billion in revenues. Recent accounting scandals from Enron and Worldcom, and looming SEC issues have not kept JPMC from holding onto 5th place within the banking sector. The top four global banks are Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas, and Bank of America with $66.8, $64.2, $55, and $52.6 billion in revenues, respectively. JPMC did so well navigating its own post-merger operations that it won International Financing Magazine’s 2001 “Bank of the Year” award. Maintaining its inherited leads in its various business lines is JPMC’s challenge.
JPMC today, one month shy of its two year anniversary, holds an overall 54th place in the Global 500 with $50.4 billion in revenues. Recent accounting scandals from Enron and Worldcom, and looming SEC issues have not kept JPMC from holding onto 5th place within the banking sector. The top four global banks are Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, BNP Paribas, and Bank of America with $66.8, $64.2, $55, and $52.6 billion in revenues, respectively. JPMC did so well navigating its own post-merger operations that it won International Financing Magazine’s 2001 “Bank of the Year” award. Maintaining its inherited leads in its various business lines is JPMC’s challenge.
In the consumer arena, JPMC is one of the nation's top mortgage lenders, automobile loan writers, and credit card issuers. The company's investment banking operations (including JP Morgan H&Q) boast expertise in M&A consulting, risk management, and debt and securities underwriting. Its asset management business includes the prestigious JP Morgan Private Bank, institutional investment manager JP Morgan Fleming, and a 45% stake in mutual fund company American Century.
JPMC ranks first in arranging syndicated loans for corporations, first in derivatives and fourth in bond underwriting. It also boasts the world's second-largest private bank as well as the fourth-biggest asset management franchise.
JPMC is a formidable player in the M&A business, offering large clients with complex banking needs a “one-stop shop”. The 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act opened the doors for lending and cash-management services - the purviews of commercial banks - to exist under the same roof as stock and bond underwriting, the realm of investment banks and brokerage houses. As a result, Citibank paired up with brokerage firm Salomon Smith Barney to form Citigroup (the largest financial institution in the U.S.). Chase Manhattan Bank nabbed tony investment bank J.P. Morgan. Overseas, global marriages yielded UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston, and Deutsche Bank. These are the Goliath “universal banks”, which offer all products and services to everyone - individuals, small businesses, non-profits, middle markets, Fortune 1000 companies. Euromoney ranks JPMC #1 in mergers and acquisitions for many international markets. In the U.S. for 1Q – 3Q 2002, JPMC is ranked sixth, one step down from fifth last year in the same period (see Appendices).
The merger of JP Morgan and Chase created the second largest bank holding company in the country. In the United States, the merged group ranked behind Citigroup, with approximately $800 billion in assets, and Bank of America, with $680 billion in assets. Michael E. Porter’s Five-Forces model makes it possible to analyze the merger and determine the position of JPMC within its industry by examining the industry itself, its competitors, threat of substitutes and entry barriers.
The banking industry is highly competitive but also very attractive because of the high return on investments. The industry, which is mature, rewards those companies that have a fast learning curve as well as a brand name and image portraying stability and reliability. JPMC has all of the characteristics mentioned above and therefore should be able to maintain its position in the industry. Both companies have large economies of scale, a prestigious name, a large asset base and extensive geographic coverage.
The market position of JPMC eases its learning curve by providing the company with leverage in its sector, allowing it to compete aggressively and solidify its foothold in core markets. Barriers to entry are high, and as industry consolidation of “universal banks” continue, smaller players will be pushed out or limited to small niches. The product offerings of the “universal banks” are marketed locally, and JPMC should also continue this effort assertively. The aggressive nature of the banking sector allows consumers to choose between products; their buying power is increased as more savings are passed on to them. Consumers are able to determine their investment portfolio by using Internet brokerage companies and are no longer willing to pay large sums to traditional brokerage houses. A reduction in brokerage house investments from the private consumer lowers JPMC’s earnings while simultaneously increasing the consumer’s bargaining power.
As stated by Strickland & Thompson, “Mergers are an adaptive response by an organization to changes in its environment. It enables the organization to offer a more robust response to match environmental complexity.” The merger of Chase and JP Morgan created an organization where the sum is greater than the parts.
JPMC IN ASIA
In order to understand the importance of the merger and its effect on M&As in Asia, it is important to analyze the industry and its components. Michael E. Porter’s Five-Forces model allows for the analysis of the industry by focusing on five key aspects: intensity of rivalry, threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers, and bargaining power of suppliers.
In order to understand the importance of the merger and its effect on M&As in Asia, it is important to analyze the industry and its components. Michael E. Porter’s Five-Forces model allows for the analysis of the industry by focusing on five key aspects: intensity of rivalry, threat of new entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers, and bargaining power of suppliers.
The intensity of rivalry brings an important aspect for JPMC, product differentiation. In order to be truly competitive and gain market share, JPMC has to be able to differentiate its product line from its competitors. The threat of new entrants is limited since the financial services industry is a mature industry and start-up costs are prohibitive. There are a multitude of available substitutes in the financial services industry and JPMC must focus on building its client base while maintaining reliable, stable service. With the advent of Internet-based financial services corporations and do-it-yourself investment sites, customers have found a new base to wield their bargaining power. Suppliers have limited bargaining powers with JPMC since it contributes heavily to the overall quality of the industry, is forward integrated, and holds a substantial amount of assets.
Applying Porter’s Five-Forces model to M&A in Asia, the picture is not much different. JPMC holds a substantial market share with almost a quarter of all deals being financed by JPMC. The competition is Asia is as ferocious as in the United States. New entrants into the Asian M&A market would have to compete with an established brand name, a large customer base, and a history of success. Government regulations are also reducing the possibility of new entrants and securing JPMC’s hold on its market share.
The threat of substitutes in Asian M&A dealings is still the biggest problem. Consumers and corporations can take their pick of any number of successful and famous corporations. Again, in order to succeed JPMC has to differentiate its product line and build on its core competencies in retail and investment banking. The bargaining power of buyers remains the same while suppliers are dealing with a corporation of immense wealth and power.
In 2001 JPMC was named the top M&A adviser in Asia by Thompson Financial Securities Data (TFSD). JPMC was responsible for providing advice regarding financial deals in Asia totaling $55 billion dollars in 2000. The firm also provided advice regarding already closed deals which had a value of $58 billion dollars. Throughout 2001 JPMC concluded 60 M&A transactions, which was double the amount of the leading competitor, CSFB. This clearly shows the ability of JPMC regarding M&A operations. However, it should be noted that JPMC (mainly Chase at the time) had to invest millions of dollars during the creation of its M&A franchise. With the profits reaped thus far, the investment seems to have been a wise decision for the firm.
THE MERGER – JPMC HISTORY, INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
JPMC HISTORY
In 1854, Junius Morgan created one of Wall Street's most prestigious firms by taking over the London-based merchant-banking firm he had set up with his US business partner George Peabody. JP Morgan developed a prestigious brand image reflecting excellence in the financial market.
In 1854, Junius Morgan created one of Wall Street's most prestigious firms by taking over the London-based merchant-banking firm he had set up with his US business partner George Peabody. JP Morgan developed a prestigious brand image reflecting excellence in the financial market.
Chase was created combining the Manhattan Co., Chase National bank and Chemical bank. Its main strength is in retail banking including corporate and consumer banking. Aside from its retail banking operations, Chase’s brand name in investment banking did not reflect its capabilities. Previous attempts by the company to expand its investment banking operations had failed, and Chase believed the solution to this problem could be found in a major acquisition. A major acquisition or merger would allow Chase to strengthen its position and growth in capital markets, investment banking and all financial services businesses.
JP Morgan’s second quarter results for the year 2000 showed a net income of $1.170 billion against a net income of $1.104 billion for the previous quarter. Chase Manhattan, the third largest US bank in terms of assets, had reported net earnings of $1.09 billion by the end of second quarter of this year, down 21.6 per cent compared to the previous corresponding quarter.
THE MERGER OF JP MORGAN AND CHASE MANHATTAN
The merged company will have assets of approximately $660 billion and stockholders' equity of more than $36 billion. On a pro-forma basis, JPMC in 1999 had a net income of approximately $7.5 billion and revenues of approximately $31 billion. The merger agreement provided that 3.7 shares of Chase common stock were exchanged for each share of JP Morgan common stock. Each series of preferred stock of JP Morgan were exchanged for a similar series of preferred Chase stock. The transaction was accounted for as a pooling of interests and was tax-free to JP Morgan and Chase stockholders. The merger resulted in synergies of approximately $1.9 billion (pre-tax) and cost savings of approximately $1.5 billion (pre-tax). It also yielded incremental net revenues of approximately $400 million (pre-tax).
The merged company will have assets of approximately $660 billion and stockholders' equity of more than $36 billion. On a pro-forma basis, JPMC in 1999 had a net income of approximately $7.5 billion and revenues of approximately $31 billion. The merger agreement provided that 3.7 shares of Chase common stock were exchanged for each share of JP Morgan common stock. Each series of preferred stock of JP Morgan were exchanged for a similar series of preferred Chase stock. The transaction was accounted for as a pooling of interests and was tax-free to JP Morgan and Chase stockholders. The merger resulted in synergies of approximately $1.9 billion (pre-tax) and cost savings of approximately $1.5 billion (pre-tax). It also yielded incremental net revenues of approximately $400 million (pre-tax).
Entering the asset management market is associated with high costs and many analysts believe this will make it difficult for Chase to meet its market expectations. According to Chris Isidore (9/13/00) of www.cnnmoney.com “Chase paid top dollars and this is going to create substantial strains on Chase…there is tremendous execution risk going forward. I think its going to be very difficult cultural fit.”
The merger of Chase Manhattan Corporation and JP Morgan & Co. gave consumers premier brand names and core capabilities that will tremendously influence the product offerings of the industry and allow JPMC to continue being a global leader in the financial services industry. The merger was anticipated to position the company for growth and increased profitability. According to the CEO of Chase, “The growth will come from being able to offer Morgan’s broader range of products to Chase’s much larger client base.”
The wholesale business of JP Morgan encompasses investment banking (including strategic advisory, equity and debt capital raising, credit, and global trading and market-making activities), operating services, wealth management, institutional asset management and private equity. The retail business of Chase consists of credit cards, regional consumer banking in the New York region and Texas, mortgage banking, diversified consumer lending, insurance and middle-market banking.
The merger, according to the CEO of JP Morgan, Mr. Warner: -
- “Is a breakthrough for the companies and will position the new firm as a global powerhouse. With a formidable client franchise and a potent array of capabilities to address the full spectrum of clients' needs.”
- "This transaction combines the most comprehensive group of clients with extensive financial and intellectual capital. We will have the capability to meet our clients' needs anywhere in the world with trusted advice and integrated execution.”
- “Our new firm will have leadership positions across a broad array of businesses in growth markets. Expense savings will also result as we combine duplicate functions.” (www.egolia.com)
According to Hax and Majluf (1996) strategy is “an attempt to achieve a long-term, sustainable advantage in each of its businesses by responding appropriately to the opportunities and threats in the firm’s environment, and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization.” They further stated that strategy does not happen but is made by managerial actions and decisions when opening up new opportunities for sustained profitability in all of the businesses of the firm. For the J.P Morgan and Chase merger to produce the desired outcome, both companies must be in a better position than they were before. Consumers must be willing to place their trust in one entity and believe that they will increase their return on investments through JPMC's know-how. The company should use the opportunity to leverage their powerful brand name. They should be able to coordinate their strategic activities across countries. Finally, they should be able to achieve economies of scale and benefits from their combined experience curve.
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT OF THE MERGER
Chase Manhattan Corp. boosted its Asian investment banking business with its $35 billion acquisition of JP Morgan. In Hong Kong, Chase shifted its focus in money management from retail banking to investment banking by purchasing Robert Fleming’s’ Ord Minnett, an Australian investment bank. JP Morgan was strong in Japanese government bonds and asset management, while Chase's focus was on corporate banking. JP Morgan, with a firm foothold in global investment banking, had made its Asian headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.
Chase Manhattan Corp. boosted its Asian investment banking business with its $35 billion acquisition of JP Morgan. In Hong Kong, Chase shifted its focus in money management from retail banking to investment banking by purchasing Robert Fleming’s’ Ord Minnett, an Australian investment bank. JP Morgan was strong in Japanese government bonds and asset management, while Chase's focus was on corporate banking. JP Morgan, with a firm foothold in global investment banking, had made its Asian headquarters in Tokyo, Japan.
The top three bookrunners of Asian equity deals in the first quarter of 2000 were Goldman Sachs, BNP Peregrine and China International Capital Corp, according to Thomson Financial. In 1999 in Asia, excluding Japanese mergers and acquisition advisory, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. took top honors, capturing 54.6% of the total deals valued at $34.9 billion. Thompson Financial indicated that JP Morgan was number five and Fleming’s number eight. Further, the purchase boosted its profile in retail and institutional stockbroking in Australia. JP Morgan Australia Pty has an established role in project finance and securitisation, while Chase is a player in fixed income capital markets, ranks as number three in high-grade corporate debt for international and Australian issues, and is also number three in syndicated loans.
From an international perspective, the merger was a strategic fit. The challenge lies in Chase and J. P. Morgan’s ability to assimilate the operations of both companies and merge two distinct organizational cultures will be of the essence to their survival. In order for cost savings to occur, duplication and overlapping of services must be eliminated. The resources of both banks need to be streamlined to produce stronger competitive capabilities in the international market. On a worldwide basis, in the year-to-date rankings for 2000, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch & Co Inc grabbed the top three spots for M&A adviser rankings, with Chase number nine and JP Morgan taking tenth place. In Japan it was perceived that the combined strengths of both companies would lift the standings of Chase and Morgan in the league tables.
Chase should be able to aggressively expand its international coverage and increase its customer base with the help of JP Morgan’s name in the international market. Both companies should be able to achieve synergies and deliver to the consumer a total package.
According to Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) “The challenge of Global efficiency and competitiveness requires management to capture the various scale and scope economies available. As well as capitalizing on the competitive advantages inherent in its worldwide market positioning.”
CONCLUSION AREAS OF SUCCESS
JPMC is currently one of the world’s premier investment banking firms and offers their clients multiple options for asset management. There are multiple areas of success that have lead to the success of JPMC as a commercial and investment bank. These areas include:
JPMC is currently one of the world’s premier investment banking firms and offers their clients multiple options for asset management. There are multiple areas of success that have lead to the success of JPMC as a commercial and investment bank. These areas include:
(a) Risk Management
JPMC is a premier financial institution and the largest provider of derivative solutions in the world. The experience of its financial managers and the financial structure of JPMC has allowed for the firm to better protect investors against volatility.
(b) Capital Raising
JPMC can quickly meet and exceed the needs of equity, debt, or private clients. This is accomplished by combining distribution capability and origination strength. After the merger JPMC became the world’s largest debt brokerage center due to its financial strengths in loan syndications and fixed income originations.
(c) Strategic Advisory
JPMC offers its clients tailored advice in several market sectors including reorganizations, M&As, and divestitures. Developing the right approach for its customers is an intricate process requiring the help of a management team. It begins by carefully screening its potential clients, evaluating the transaction, and finally executing the client-based strategy. This approach allows JPMC not only to understand the market sector of its clients but allows for the building of a customer specific strategic outlook.
JPMC also has an extensive amount of research coverage which involves over 3,000 companies worldwide. JPMC’s focus is upon the establishment of long-term client relationships rather than single profitable transactions. Its client loyalty rests with its ability to find solutions for the most complex financial challenges.
STRATEGIC FOCI
The M&A operation of JPMC is a significant achievement since the M&A market in Asia has a value of nearly $200 billion. Richard Kelly, head of JPMC’s M&A operations in Asia, stated that JPMC will once again be placed at the top of the M&A market. The main reason for JPMC’s advances in the M&A market in Asia is a shift in its focus regarding the M&A market as a necessity for overall success. The tactic that JPMC implements regarding M&A is quite simple. The firm locates countries in Asia that have created monopoly industries, resulting in a surplus of licensees and the need to merge with other companies to remain competitive. JPMC takes advantage of this by offering their M&A services as a solution. The target markets are currently the power and transportation sectors of the Asian economies. Another market that JPMC is considering targeting lies with companies that are adjusting to the concept of free trade and need financial direction. Whatever markets JPMC decides to target, it is almost certain that their expertise in the field will be the model example.
The M&A operation of JPMC is a significant achievement since the M&A market in Asia has a value of nearly $200 billion. Richard Kelly, head of JPMC’s M&A operations in Asia, stated that JPMC will once again be placed at the top of the M&A market. The main reason for JPMC’s advances in the M&A market in Asia is a shift in its focus regarding the M&A market as a necessity for overall success. The tactic that JPMC implements regarding M&A is quite simple. The firm locates countries in Asia that have created monopoly industries, resulting in a surplus of licensees and the need to merge with other companies to remain competitive. JPMC takes advantage of this by offering their M&A services as a solution. The target markets are currently the power and transportation sectors of the Asian economies. Another market that JPMC is considering targeting lies with companies that are adjusting to the concept of free trade and need financial direction. Whatever markets JPMC decides to target, it is almost certain that their expertise in the field will be the model example.
An example of a successful M&A operation in the Asia/Pacific region can be seen with the company BHP/Billition in Australia. This M&A transaction was the largest ever conducted in Australia and involved $35 billion dollars. When BHP and Billiton merged they created the world’s largest diversified mining company. JP Morgan had originally been the corporate broker and financial advisor to Billition since 1997. Since the creation of JPMC, the firm decided that it would be in the best interest of Billiton to merge with BHP resulting in higher revenues and a more efficient corporation. After the merger was completed BHP/Billition has indeed become more efficient and has experienced an extreme growth in revenue. JPMC believes that the main influences regarding expected 2003 M&A Australian operations will be international economic conditions and possible media regulation changes. Another factor JPMC takes into consideration is the continued attractiveness of the country due to the weak Australian dollar and the necessity for corporations to increase in scale, not to mention the current changes regarding the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) regulations. JPMC continues to advise the corporation regarding several other department acquisitions and currently holds lead management positions in its debt and equity financing divisions. This is just one example of how the opportunities in Asia will help maintain the competitive advantage of JPMC in Asia. After all, the firm itself is the example of how a merger can be successful and lead to increased future success.
In 2001, JPMC reported a net income of $1,694 million or .80 per share including merger and restructuring costs. When compared with the 2000 results of $5,727 million dollars or $2.86 dollars per share, the losses can be clearly recognized. These figures show that the economic conditions of 2001 negatively affected activity but did not present a significant threat to the M&A department. The absence of a significant threat to the M&A operations is due to an increase in opportunities for the combined entity’s equities business in Asia. During 2000, JP Morgan had ranked seventh in the Asian equity league tables according to figures supplied by Capital Data Equityware. With a 2.81% market share, it led 13 deals and raised a total of $1.196 billion. Since JP Morgan originally did not have much of an equity presence in Asia, the merger had allowed for the firm to penetrate this market. JP Morgan had originally tried to enter the Asian equity market in the past, but abandoned the tactic after it proved to be too challenging. Shortly before the merger, JP Morgan was attempting to correct this mistake by establishing a new platform from Japan. Since the merger, this process has become a strategic priority and JPMC is already advancing within the Asian equity market.
The $35 billion dollar merger of Chase Manhattan Corporation and JP Morgan is one of the financial industries largest deals presenting JPMC with new challenges. Within the financial industry, a larger firm usually is better if it has a solid foundation. M&A is only as valuable as the capacity and products that the firm has to offer its clients. The merger of JPMC has indeed created a formidable firm within the global financial industry but this is only due to the excellent management staff that conducted this operation. Chase voiced concerns that the combination of two different corporate cultures may cause difficulties after the merger. During the integration process, special attention was paid to making a successful transition without draining knowledge from experienced managers. Chase also had to increase its status in the profitable equity underwriting business and provide substantial evidence for the valuation it placed on JP Morgan. However, in the case of Chase and J.P. Morgan success depended on whether the executives could maintain the best people within each firm. With the success of Chase regarding past mergers, they were very selective and managed to retain the necessary people thus far to keep the firm moving forward. As the adjustment process continues, the overlap in the merger continues to create challenges, but the firm is overcoming the obstacles as they appear.
Despite the many challenges that JPMC faces after the merger, they are making a forceful effort to maintain their competitive edge. The firm is aggressively cutting expenses and has increased their goal regarding merger-related costs from $2.0 billion to $3.8 billion. Results showed that by the end of 2001, JPMC was holding 75% of their expected savings. However, overall results for 2001 were extremely disappointing. The negative results were not only attributed to the costs incurred by the merger, but also to the dramatic decline in the stock market and a global recession. Other negative factors contributing to its poor results were reduced volumes in M&A and initial public offerings (IPOs). All of these factors combined took an especially heavy toll on the investment banking and asset management businesses. Despite all of the negative factors, JPMC managed to perform better than most of its competitors. The firm’s cash operating return on equity was 10% in 2001, but when JPMC Partners were not included in the total, the return was actually 15%.
As the firm advances from one of its most difficult credit cycles there is a very forceful effort being made to minimize losses and improve overall operations. The management teams are cutting costs through employee reductions to improve operating revenues, while still addressing issues of merging the two organizations’ cultures. Most of the cuts were on the Chase side. Restructuring the private equity business to increase diversification and decrease risk exposure allows JPMC to invest significant capital with its clients. This allows JPMC to increase its revenue benefiting both the firm and its clients.
Middle markets restructuring and consolidation efforts should continue to strengthen JPMC’s position in the sector. Third quarter of this year, middle markets posted earnings of $91 million, a 26% jump over profits of $72 million in the same period a year ago.
Other areas of strategic focus include product differentiation. JPMC is competing with a number of players who are aggressively increasing their market share by offering products which compete directly with JPMC products. Clients, particularly Fortune 500 which are most likely to engage in M&A, are increasingly seeking the one-stop shop services of universal banks. For JPMC to remain competitive as it adjusts to its internal reorganizations, it must continue to innovate.
One of the M&A related services which can further drive revenues is the not-so-new practice of “tying”. Illegal for over three decades, universal banks can now utilize this marketing technique to win and retain business. In short, lenders “tie” their loan offers to deals in capital markets business. The fees from consulting are substantial, and by-and-large Fortune 500 client appreciate the one-stop shop packaged solution. What JPMC needs to watch more carefully is its role in counseling and producing creative lending, as seen in the Enron and Worldcom cases, which are closely related to each other.
From an international perspective, JPMC is demonstrating that the merger has only made the firm stronger. Since almost half of the firm’s revenue and income from wholesale banking comes from outside the United States, the international market is essential to the success of the firm. Once the restructuring process has been completed JPMC can employ its full vision and strategy for the international financial markets. With a global-local approach, JPMC can gain market share where it already clearly has a strong presence - Asia, Europe, and Latin America (see Appendices). As a universal bank, JPMC can aggressively pursue its new role as a full-service, integrated financial services provider to individuals of all types, governments, corporations, and other institutions on a global basis. Already strong as separate entities, united as JPMC with the power of both brands behind it, JPMC can maintain its competitive advantage and remain a leader on the global financial industry stage.
APPENDIX I
Euromoney 2002 Awards JPMorganChase Best M&A House
There weren't any huge M&A deals in the past year, but JP Morgan advised on some highly complex ones...in Brazil, JPMorgan advised mining giant CVRD on two simultaneous M&A transactions... It's that sort of complex transactions that can take well over a year and also involves large-scale foreign exchange hedging, in which JP Morgan excels.
Best M&A House in Latin AmericaBest M&A House in ChileBest M&A House in Costa RicaBest M&A House in MexicoBest M&A House in IndonesiaBest M&A House in TaiwanBest M&A House in ThailandBest M&A House in Greece
APPENDIX B
Top 20 Advisers of US M&A Deals
First 9 months 2002
Provided by Dealogic, www.euromoney.com.
Rank Adviser US$ m Deals Jan-Sep 2001 Rank
1 Goldman Sachs 140,853 92 12 Lazard 80,667 56 163 Bear Stearns 76,813 34 114 Salomon Smith Barney 70,974 79 65 Credit Suisse First Boston 64,752 162 26 JP Morgan 57,763 95 57 Morgan Stanley 57,490 89 48 Merrill Lynch 48,866 68 39 Lehman Brothers 44,774 71 910 Deutsche Bank 31,143 58 711 UBS Warburg 27,664 50 812 Bank of America 20,185 51 1413 Stephens 15,279 8 1714 Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 11,277 24 1215 Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin 7,784 102 1916 Rothschild 5,848 37 1317 CIBC World Markets 5,431 6 2018 Greenhill 5,160 15 1519 Rhone Group 4,953 2 -20 ING Barings 4,843 8 -
Criteria: excludes withdrawn deals and buyback programs, includes assumption of debt;
based on full amount credit, announced deals Jan 1 – Sep 30 with US target or acquiror nationality
based on full amount credit, announced deals Jan 1 – Sep 30 with US target or acquiror nationality
APPENDIX III SAMPLING OF GLOBAL M&A INVESTMENT BANKS
BNP Paribas
Specialized international banking group with a European base that focuses on expanding markets, emphasizing technological innovation, creativity, worldwide presence and distribution.
Brown Brothers Harriman
Based in New York and provides private equity capital to private and closely-held public companies with business values between $20 million and $1 billion.
CIBC World Markets
Investment banking and private client arm of the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) offering a full range of integrated credit and capital markets products, securities, brokerage and asset management services to corporate, government, institutions.
Deutsche Bank - GCI
Global Investment Banking Division provides a full range of financial and strategic advisory services to corporations, financial institutions and governments worldwide.
Dresdner Kleinwort Benson
Investment banking division of the Dresdner Bank Group of Europe. Dresdner Kleinwort Benson consists of four business lines: Global Corporate Finance, Global Equities, Global Finance and Global Markets.
ING Barings
ING Barings is the corporate and investment banking arm of ING Group, providing an extensive range of financial products and services to corporate and institutional clients around the world through a network of 89 offices in 49 countries.
JP Morgan Fleming
Asset management division of JP Morgan Chase that offers individual and institutional clients investment products consistent with their goals.
Lazard
A global firm with a long history in the traditional financial centers of New York, London, and Paris and offices in over fifteen countries.
Nomura International
The investment banking operations of Nomura International plc, the European subsidiary of the Nomura Securities Co., Ltd., are focused to meeting the needs of investors and issuers across Europe.
RBC Dominion Securities Inc
RBC Dominion Securities, a business unit of Royal Bank Financial Group, is Canada's leading corporate and investment bank.
SG Hambros
A division of the Société Générale Group, providing investment banking services.
REFERENCES Alpert, G, & Pollock, S. (2000, January) JPMorganChase: The WetFeet.com Insider Guide [Electronic Version]. Retrieved November 11, 2002, from http://www.wetfeet.com
Arnold C. Hax & Nicolas S. Majluf. (1996). The strategy concept and process. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Arthur A. Thompson & A.J. Strickland. (2001). Strategic management concept and cases. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Blustein, Paul. (2001). The chastening: Inside the crisis that rocked the global financial system and humbled the IMF. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
Chernow, Ron. (1991). The house of Morgan: An American banking dynasty and the rise of modern finance. Carmichael, CA: Touchstone Books.
Fox, L. (2003). Enron, the rise and fall. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Hertz, Noreena. (2002). The silent takeover: Global capitalism and the death of democracy. Lowood, Australia: Arrow Publishing.
JP Morgan Chase (Ed.). (2001). Annual Reports 2000-2001 [Electronic Version]. Retrieved November 7, 2002, from http://www.jpmorganchase.com/cm/cs?pagename=Chase/Href&urlname=jpmc/ir/annual
Kahn, Shahrukh Rafi. (1999). Do World Bank and IMF policies work? Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
McCarthy, J. (Ed.). (2001). Climate Change 2001: Impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability : Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change [Electronic Version]. Retrieved November 2, 2002, from http://www.grida.no/climate/ ipcc_tar/wg2/index.htm
O'Brien, R., Goetz, A, & Scholte, J, Williams, M. (2000). Contesting global governance : Multilateral economic institutions and global social movements. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Silverman, Gary. (2002, November 7). JP Morgan mulls retail banking acquisitions [Electronic Version]. Financial Times. Retrieved November 10, 2002, from http://news.ft.com/s01/servlet/ContentServer?pagename= Synd/StoryFT/FTFull&artid=1035873108278
Smith, Dan. (1999). The state of the world atlas. London, England: Penguin Group.
Soros, George. (1994). The alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
Soros, George. (2002). George Soros on globalization. New York, NY: Public Affairs.
World Development Report 2003: Sustainable development in a dynamic world: Transforming institutions, growth, and quality of life. (2002). Washington, DC: World Bank.
Caterpillar vs. Komatsu: Four Decades of Global Competition
Caterpillar: Market Dominator of Construction & Mining Equipment, Machinery
For more than 75 years, Caterpillar Inc. has been building the world's infrastructure, and in partnership with Caterpillar dealers, has allowed for positive and sustainable change on every continent. A Fortune 100 company, Caterpillar is the world's leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, and industrial gas turbines. The company is a technology leader in construction, transportation, mining, forestry, energy, logistics, electronics, financing and electric power generation.
In the first half of 2002, Caterpillar posted profit of $280 million or 81 cents per share, the total of sales and revenues of $9.70 billion. More than half of all sales were to customers outside of the United States, maintaining Caterpillar's status of an international business and leading U.S. exporter. Caterpillar products and components are manufactured in 50 U.S. facilities and in 65 other locations in 23 countries around the globe.
During the year 2001 Caterpillar invested almost $700 million in research and technological development. This allowed for the employees of Caterpillar to receive over 2,800 patents since 1996.
History - Caterpillar
Caterpillar Inc. was founded in 1925 when the Holt Manufacturing Co. and the C. L. Best Tractor Co. merged to form Caterpillar Tractor Co. Caterpillar aimed to be the leader in providing the best value in machines, engines and support services for customers dedicated to building the world's infrastructure, and developing and transporting its resources.
Fifteen years later in 1940, the Caterpillar product line now included motor graders, blade graders, elevating graders, tractors and electrical generating sets. With the outbreak of World War 2, Caterpillar track-type tractors, motor graders, generators sets, and a special engine for the M4 tank were bought in great quantities by the U.S. in its war effort.
In 1981, Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. was formed to offer equipment financing options to customers worldwide. This positive step in expansion has allowed for Caterpillar to become a major competitor in the international business world. A profile has been listed below to further explain the impact Caterpillar Financial Services has made regarding expansion of the corporation.
Profile - Caterpillar Financial Services
Based in Nashville, Tenn., Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation is the financial arm of the Fortune 500 company, Caterpillar Inc. It offers a wide range of financing alternatives for the complete line of Caterpillar equipment, solar gas turbines, products equipped with Cat components, fork lift trucks manufactured by Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift of America, Inc., and related products sold through Cat dealers. Caterpillar Financial Services also extends loans to customers and dealers around the world. Serving customers around the globe with offices and subsidiaries located throughout the Americas, Australia, Europe, and Asia, Caterpillar Financial offers competitive rates and customized financing options to meet customers' financial needs.
Major Achievements - Caterpillar Financial
Caterpillar Financial continued its growth in 2001 with record revenues of $1.62 billion. The increase of $177 million compared with 2000 was primarily related to a larger portfolio and increased gains on sales of receivables. Profit after tax was a record $212 million, an increase of $53 million from last year. The increase in profit resulted primarily from the larger portfolio.
Caterpillar Financial has also managed to penetrate multiple international markets throughout the world, creating an international dealer network. This process of internationalization continues to grow at an ever increasing pace and has allowed for Caterpillar to maintain the strategic international business status that it have today.
Caterpillar dealerships have continued successfully to work with Caterpillar Financial services around the world, serving customers where they work and live. Caterpillars Financial Services global locations include Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany (including Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, two offices in Canada, and four regional offices within the United States.
In countries where Caterpillar does not yet have a physical presence, they provide financing through their Global Accounts Division.
History – Caterpillar: Other divisions Five years after the war, in 1950, Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. in Great Britain is established, This is the first of many overseas operations created to help manage foreign exchange shortages, tariffs, import controls and better serve customers around the world. This expansion of Caterpillar into Europe allowed for Caterpillar to take its products and services into the international market.
The company next decided to create a separate sales and marketing division just for engine customers. Since the creation of the Engine Division, Caterpillar Inc has become a major player within the diesel engine market and now generates 25% of the total sales of Caterpillar Inc.
After Caterpillar had penetrated the market within the UK, the company next decided to attempt to enter the Japanese market.
Komatsu
The main competitors that Caterpillar faced within the Japanese market were Komatsu and Mitsubishi. The company of Komatsu was especially dangerous to Caterpillar due to the fact that it was the second largest EME company worldwide. Due to this danger Caterpillar decided to penetrate the Japanese market through a joint venture with Mitsubishi. The result of this was that Caterpillar and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. formed one of the first joint ventures in Japan to include partial U.S. ownership. Caterpillar Mitsubishi Ltd. started production in 1965, has been renamed Shin Caterpillar Mitsubishi Ltd., and is now the No. 2 maker of construction and mining equipment in Japan.
Komatsu now understood the competition it faced but still held a 60% market share within Japan. With the threat of the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi venture taking place Komatsu decided to attempt a revitalization of the company. Since Komatsu mainly exported whole machines, the company soon realized that needed to also expand into other markets and set up assembly plans in places like Brazil and Mexico.
The management staff in Komatsu began to establish business relationships with multiple countries, primarily focusing on third world countries and the communist states that existed during that time. Komatsu lacked and effective dealer network, which forced the company to rely on nonexclusive dealerships. This ultimately led to Komatsu receiving smaller contracts than Caterpillar. Caterpillar's global dealer network provided a key competitive edge - customers deal with people they know and trust. This is due to the fact that almost all dealerships are independent and locally owned. Many have relationships with their customers that span at least two generations. Caterpillar dealers serve equipment, service and financing needs for customers in more than 200 countries. The rental services are also offered at more than 1,200 outlets worldwide.
Sources of success – Komatsu Komatsu has been a leader in innovative quality-control initiatives ever since President Yashinari Kawai decided to leverage MITI’s opening of the EME industry in 1963, and fight back in the face of the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi joint venture. He set 2 goals: acquire the best advanced technology from overseas, and Total Quality Control (TQC) systems.
New licensing arrangements were set with International Harvester, Bucyrus-Erie, and Cummins Engine. Within 3 years of launching TQC initiatives, Komatsu was awarded the Deming Prize for quality control in 1964, the same year of Project A’s launch.
Project A aimed to upgrade the quality of the small-medium-sized bulldozers, Komatsu’s primary product. In 1965-1970, despite the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi JV, Komatsu was able to increase market share to 65% through Project A.
In 1972, Komatsu launched Project B, focusing on exports and R&D of the large bulldozer, the main export, and was successful. As with Project A, ugrading of quality and reliability were key. The ratio of exports to total sales grew from 20% (1973) to 41% (1974) to 55% (1975).
By 1976, Komatsu held 60% of the Japanese market, Mitsubishi/Caterpillar, 30%. A cost reduction plan, V-10 Campaign, was initiated, as well as new product development programs.
Between 1976-1982, the end of the Kawai era, Komatsu made a significant decision to be freed of its licensing arrangements, and to broaden its product line to grow its dealers distribution system to better compete against Cat. 1981 saw Komatsu’s 60th anniversary, and the launch of EPOCHS. This project focused upon meeting market specification needs, without weakening its cost positions. R&D, individual plants, integrated and concentrated production systems, were all strengthened. In 1981, Komatsu was awarded the Japan Quality Control Prize, a globally supreme quality-control honor.
Performance – Komatsu (1980’s) In 1982, after 18 years of incredible growth, Ryoichi Kawai handed leadership to Shoji Nogawa. The performance of Komatsu deteriorated so quickly because the company continued to focus on traditional policies, such as it’s reliance on highly efficient centralized international production facilities. This problem became much worse as external pressures increased: falling demand, worldwide price wars, a rapidly appreciating yen, and heightened trade frictions throughout the industry. Komatsu also faced antidumping suits. In 1985 the situation reached a climatic point when the yen suddenly surged from a dramatic decline.
Mr. Nogawa was very slow in implementing his short and medium term recovery plans, including raising prices abroad, expanding overseas parts procurement, and cutting production costs. Mr. Nogawa also rejected a proposal by American distributors to move additional production overseas until is was too late, by this time the yen had increased even further. Ultimately, Chairman Kawai decided to replace Mr.Nogawa with Masao Tanaka in June 1987.
Executive Performance – Komatsu: Tanaka, Katada Both Tanaka and Katada managed to manage an increasingly difficult situation similar to the one that plagued Nogawa. Tanaka was defensive in his decisions, hedging against the high-yen environment, and managed to pursue internationalization much more than Nogawa; including establishing individual bases of operations that acted independently regarding sales, manufacturing and finance. These bases would be responsible for the three core markets of Komatsu: Japan, Europe, and USA.
Katada created a more innovative approach with the company and focused towards the constant improvement of products and services. He also developed programs that focused more on challenging many of the companies traditional organizational process and wanted every concept completely understand by all employees before it is implemented.
Katada also created the “three G” slogan that would forever change Komatsu, this means “Growth , Global, and Group-wide”. This process eventually paved the way for improvements in the company in key areas such as management/employee relations and development. This also allowed for increased global operations and productivity.
Environmental forces, industry changes - Komatsu vis-à-vis Cat responses? The U.S. recession woes of the early 1980’s were shared by Europe and Latin America, and Africa, and the Middle East felt the ripple effects. Worldwide, the EME industry faced overcapacity and low demand. For Cat, the world market leader, East Asia remained as a possibility for growth.
Ryochi Kawai did very well in an environment of great industry challenges. Fighting back in the face of the Mitsubishi/Cat JV, he emphasized Komatsu’s original goals towards overseas markets and consumer satisfaction, and added vertical integration (raw materials through finished product delivery) and pervasive Total Quality Control practices. The spirit of Komatsu was to seek out the root causes of issues, and always strive for innovation and future growth. A long history of good labor relations, many quality-control programs which won premier awards, R&D innovation, profitability, overseas distribution channels growth, and dominant local market share all attest to Kawai’s excellent leadership. Perhaps Kawai could have cultivated more choices in grooming successors, in addition to Shoji Nogawa, with profiles distinct from his.
Lee Morgan’s strategy sought diversification through being involved in many sectors of the economy, instead of acquiring competitors for proliferation of products in many different lines. Japanese inventory control systems were admired by Lee. He also emphasized the subordination of personal wishes to the good of the company. A very difficult challenge was Lee’s handling of the UAW strike, which ended with some concessions on the part of Cat to UAW, but left behind a wake of dissatisfaction amongst Cat’s union workers. Perhaps Lee might have considered more inclusive ownership programs for the employees, instead of the 204-day standoff which finally ended in May 1983, one of the longest in U.S. corporate history.
Vision, strategy – Komatsu: Katada Tetsuya Katada took on the mantle of President in 1989 and did not inherit an easy situation, with sales at levels of 7 years prior, and half the profits. Komatsu’s stagnation was in great contrast to Japan’s GNP growth of 43%. Worldwide demand was up-and-down, with changing demands for lighter equipment. Katada needed a strategy for this declining sector, and recognized the need for shifting away from construction equipment and catching up to Cat.
Katada moved away from the inherited culture, which he called bureaucratic, and instilled a spirit of challenging enterprise. He pointed out that the international environment had become by this time a global economy, requiring more international harmony. His own approach was inclusive and encouraged free discussion.
He pushed for regionalizing production even during Tanaka’s tenure, reducing their yen exposure. He formed a 50% JV with U.S. Dresser, which was controversial because some didn’t see Dresser as a valuable addition with a neglected product line, low quality and plants.
Katada’s new vision was to radically depart from Komatsu’s traditional strategic maxims and management directives: centralized production, total control over product development, whole ownership of subsidiaries, and Japanese style management worldwide.
His new strategy was called the Three G’s: Growth, Global, Groupwide. The long-term strategic plan, Project G, was launched, with a focus on growth, by developing sales, and overseas production facilities, and expansion into electronics, robotics, and plastics.
His vision was, in short, to reinvent Komatsu as a total technology enterprise, a globally integrated high-tech organization that integrates hardware and software as systems, with 50% of sales in nonconstruction business.
Komatsu grew through this period until 1992, when overseas sales fell 10.6%, and domestic sales fell 13.5%. The worldwide 1992 recession seemed the culprit, in addition to Komatsu’s reliance on JV’s and acquisition of local competition.
Product quality, efficiency, and strategic focus can easily be lost in this period of reinvention, but Katada is determined and has a strong game plan. Long-term globalization focus and localization efforts have a high chance of succeeding in the global economy. Katada will be playing a difficult balancing game of maintaining home (Tokyo) control as the rest of Komatsu grows to meet his vision.
For more than 75 years, Caterpillar Inc. has been building the world's infrastructure, and in partnership with Caterpillar dealers, has allowed for positive and sustainable change on every continent. A Fortune 100 company, Caterpillar is the world's leading manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, and industrial gas turbines. The company is a technology leader in construction, transportation, mining, forestry, energy, logistics, electronics, financing and electric power generation.
In the first half of 2002, Caterpillar posted profit of $280 million or 81 cents per share, the total of sales and revenues of $9.70 billion. More than half of all sales were to customers outside of the United States, maintaining Caterpillar's status of an international business and leading U.S. exporter. Caterpillar products and components are manufactured in 50 U.S. facilities and in 65 other locations in 23 countries around the globe.
During the year 2001 Caterpillar invested almost $700 million in research and technological development. This allowed for the employees of Caterpillar to receive over 2,800 patents since 1996.
History - Caterpillar
Fifteen years later in 1940, the Caterpillar product line now included motor graders, blade graders, elevating graders, tractors and electrical generating sets. With the outbreak of World War 2, Caterpillar track-type tractors, motor graders, generators sets, and a special engine for the M4 tank were bought in great quantities by the U.S. in its war effort.
In 1981, Caterpillar Financial Services Corp. was formed to offer equipment financing options to customers worldwide. This positive step in expansion has allowed for Caterpillar to become a major competitor in the international business world. A profile has been listed below to further explain the impact Caterpillar Financial Services has made regarding expansion of the corporation.
Profile - Caterpillar Financial Services
Based in Nashville, Tenn., Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation is the financial arm of the Fortune 500 company, Caterpillar Inc. It offers a wide range of financing alternatives for the complete line of Caterpillar equipment, solar gas turbines, products equipped with Cat components, fork lift trucks manufactured by Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift of America, Inc., and related products sold through Cat dealers. Caterpillar Financial Services also extends loans to customers and dealers around the world. Serving customers around the globe with offices and subsidiaries located throughout the Americas, Australia, Europe, and Asia, Caterpillar Financial offers competitive rates and customized financing options to meet customers' financial needs.
Major Achievements - Caterpillar Financial
Caterpillar Financial continued its growth in 2001 with record revenues of $1.62 billion. The increase of $177 million compared with 2000 was primarily related to a larger portfolio and increased gains on sales of receivables. Profit after tax was a record $212 million, an increase of $53 million from last year. The increase in profit resulted primarily from the larger portfolio.
Caterpillar Financial has also managed to penetrate multiple international markets throughout the world, creating an international dealer network. This process of internationalization continues to grow at an ever increasing pace and has allowed for Caterpillar to maintain the strategic international business status that it have today.
Caterpillar dealerships have continued successfully to work with Caterpillar Financial services around the world, serving customers where they work and live. Caterpillars Financial Services global locations include Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, Australia, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany (including Austria, Hungary, and Switzerland), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, two offices in Canada, and four regional offices within the United States.
In countries where Caterpillar does not yet have a physical presence, they provide financing through their Global Accounts Division.
History – Caterpillar: Other divisions Five years after the war, in 1950, Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. in Great Britain is established, This is the first of many overseas operations created to help manage foreign exchange shortages, tariffs, import controls and better serve customers around the world. This expansion of Caterpillar into Europe allowed for Caterpillar to take its products and services into the international market.
The company next decided to create a separate sales and marketing division just for engine customers. Since the creation of the Engine Division, Caterpillar Inc has become a major player within the diesel engine market and now generates 25% of the total sales of Caterpillar Inc.
After Caterpillar had penetrated the market within the UK, the company next decided to attempt to enter the Japanese market.
Komatsu
The main competitors that Caterpillar faced within the Japanese market were Komatsu and Mitsubishi. The company of Komatsu was especially dangerous to Caterpillar due to the fact that it was the second largest EME company worldwide. Due to this danger Caterpillar decided to penetrate the Japanese market through a joint venture with Mitsubishi. The result of this was that Caterpillar and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. formed one of the first joint ventures in Japan to include partial U.S. ownership. Caterpillar Mitsubishi Ltd. started production in 1965, has been renamed Shin Caterpillar Mitsubishi Ltd., and is now the No. 2 maker of construction and mining equipment in Japan.
Komatsu now understood the competition it faced but still held a 60% market share within Japan. With the threat of the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi venture taking place Komatsu decided to attempt a revitalization of the company. Since Komatsu mainly exported whole machines, the company soon realized that needed to also expand into other markets and set up assembly plans in places like Brazil and Mexico.
The management staff in Komatsu began to establish business relationships with multiple countries, primarily focusing on third world countries and the communist states that existed during that time. Komatsu lacked and effective dealer network, which forced the company to rely on nonexclusive dealerships. This ultimately led to Komatsu receiving smaller contracts than Caterpillar. Caterpillar's global dealer network provided a key competitive edge - customers deal with people they know and trust. This is due to the fact that almost all dealerships are independent and locally owned. Many have relationships with their customers that span at least two generations. Caterpillar dealers serve equipment, service and financing needs for customers in more than 200 countries. The rental services are also offered at more than 1,200 outlets worldwide.
Sources of success – Komatsu Komatsu has been a leader in innovative quality-control initiatives ever since President Yashinari Kawai decided to leverage MITI’s opening of the EME industry in 1963, and fight back in the face of the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi joint venture. He set 2 goals: acquire the best advanced technology from overseas, and Total Quality Control (TQC) systems.
New licensing arrangements were set with International Harvester, Bucyrus-Erie, and Cummins Engine. Within 3 years of launching TQC initiatives, Komatsu was awarded the Deming Prize for quality control in 1964, the same year of Project A’s launch.
Project A aimed to upgrade the quality of the small-medium-sized bulldozers, Komatsu’s primary product. In 1965-1970, despite the Caterpillar/Mitsubishi JV, Komatsu was able to increase market share to 65% through Project A.
In 1972, Komatsu launched Project B, focusing on exports and R&D of the large bulldozer, the main export, and was successful. As with Project A, ugrading of quality and reliability were key. The ratio of exports to total sales grew from 20% (1973) to 41% (1974) to 55% (1975).
By 1976, Komatsu held 60% of the Japanese market, Mitsubishi/Caterpillar, 30%. A cost reduction plan, V-10 Campaign, was initiated, as well as new product development programs.
Between 1976-1982, the end of the Kawai era, Komatsu made a significant decision to be freed of its licensing arrangements, and to broaden its product line to grow its dealers distribution system to better compete against Cat. 1981 saw Komatsu’s 60th anniversary, and the launch of EPOCHS. This project focused upon meeting market specification needs, without weakening its cost positions. R&D, individual plants, integrated and concentrated production systems, were all strengthened. In 1981, Komatsu was awarded the Japan Quality Control Prize, a globally supreme quality-control honor.
Performance – Komatsu (1980’s) In 1982, after 18 years of incredible growth, Ryoichi Kawai handed leadership to Shoji Nogawa. The performance of Komatsu deteriorated so quickly because the company continued to focus on traditional policies, such as it’s reliance on highly efficient centralized international production facilities. This problem became much worse as external pressures increased: falling demand, worldwide price wars, a rapidly appreciating yen, and heightened trade frictions throughout the industry. Komatsu also faced antidumping suits. In 1985 the situation reached a climatic point when the yen suddenly surged from a dramatic decline.
Mr. Nogawa was very slow in implementing his short and medium term recovery plans, including raising prices abroad, expanding overseas parts procurement, and cutting production costs. Mr. Nogawa also rejected a proposal by American distributors to move additional production overseas until is was too late, by this time the yen had increased even further. Ultimately, Chairman Kawai decided to replace Mr.Nogawa with Masao Tanaka in June 1987.
Executive Performance – Komatsu: Tanaka, Katada Both Tanaka and Katada managed to manage an increasingly difficult situation similar to the one that plagued Nogawa. Tanaka was defensive in his decisions, hedging against the high-yen environment, and managed to pursue internationalization much more than Nogawa; including establishing individual bases of operations that acted independently regarding sales, manufacturing and finance. These bases would be responsible for the three core markets of Komatsu: Japan, Europe, and USA.
Katada created a more innovative approach with the company and focused towards the constant improvement of products and services. He also developed programs that focused more on challenging many of the companies traditional organizational process and wanted every concept completely understand by all employees before it is implemented.
Katada also created the “three G” slogan that would forever change Komatsu, this means “Growth , Global, and Group-wide”. This process eventually paved the way for improvements in the company in key areas such as management/employee relations and development. This also allowed for increased global operations and productivity.
Environmental forces, industry changes - Komatsu vis-à-vis Cat responses? The U.S. recession woes of the early 1980’s were shared by Europe and Latin America, and Africa, and the Middle East felt the ripple effects. Worldwide, the EME industry faced overcapacity and low demand. For Cat, the world market leader, East Asia remained as a possibility for growth.
Ryochi Kawai did very well in an environment of great industry challenges. Fighting back in the face of the Mitsubishi/Cat JV, he emphasized Komatsu’s original goals towards overseas markets and consumer satisfaction, and added vertical integration (raw materials through finished product delivery) and pervasive Total Quality Control practices. The spirit of Komatsu was to seek out the root causes of issues, and always strive for innovation and future growth. A long history of good labor relations, many quality-control programs which won premier awards, R&D innovation, profitability, overseas distribution channels growth, and dominant local market share all attest to Kawai’s excellent leadership. Perhaps Kawai could have cultivated more choices in grooming successors, in addition to Shoji Nogawa, with profiles distinct from his.
Lee Morgan’s strategy sought diversification through being involved in many sectors of the economy, instead of acquiring competitors for proliferation of products in many different lines. Japanese inventory control systems were admired by Lee. He also emphasized the subordination of personal wishes to the good of the company. A very difficult challenge was Lee’s handling of the UAW strike, which ended with some concessions on the part of Cat to UAW, but left behind a wake of dissatisfaction amongst Cat’s union workers. Perhaps Lee might have considered more inclusive ownership programs for the employees, instead of the 204-day standoff which finally ended in May 1983, one of the longest in U.S. corporate history.
Vision, strategy – Komatsu: Katada Tetsuya Katada took on the mantle of President in 1989 and did not inherit an easy situation, with sales at levels of 7 years prior, and half the profits. Komatsu’s stagnation was in great contrast to Japan’s GNP growth of 43%. Worldwide demand was up-and-down, with changing demands for lighter equipment. Katada needed a strategy for this declining sector, and recognized the need for shifting away from construction equipment and catching up to Cat.
Katada moved away from the inherited culture, which he called bureaucratic, and instilled a spirit of challenging enterprise. He pointed out that the international environment had become by this time a global economy, requiring more international harmony. His own approach was inclusive and encouraged free discussion.
He pushed for regionalizing production even during Tanaka’s tenure, reducing their yen exposure. He formed a 50% JV with U.S. Dresser, which was controversial because some didn’t see Dresser as a valuable addition with a neglected product line, low quality and plants.
Katada’s new vision was to radically depart from Komatsu’s traditional strategic maxims and management directives: centralized production, total control over product development, whole ownership of subsidiaries, and Japanese style management worldwide.
His new strategy was called the Three G’s: Growth, Global, Groupwide. The long-term strategic plan, Project G, was launched, with a focus on growth, by developing sales, and overseas production facilities, and expansion into electronics, robotics, and plastics.
His vision was, in short, to reinvent Komatsu as a total technology enterprise, a globally integrated high-tech organization that integrates hardware and software as systems, with 50% of sales in nonconstruction business.
Komatsu grew through this period until 1992, when overseas sales fell 10.6%, and domestic sales fell 13.5%. The worldwide 1992 recession seemed the culprit, in addition to Komatsu’s reliance on JV’s and acquisition of local competition.
Product quality, efficiency, and strategic focus can easily be lost in this period of reinvention, but Katada is determined and has a strong game plan. Long-term globalization focus and localization efforts have a high chance of succeeding in the global economy. Katada will be playing a difficult balancing game of maintaining home (Tokyo) control as the rest of Komatsu grows to meet his vision.
